In the first of a two part series, Dr Sarfaraz argues that the Taliban philosophy is representative of Muslim political thought, except that it is heavily influenced by tribal traditions.

In the last few years, our region has seen the resurgence of religious extremism or, more precisely speaking, the phenomenon called ‘Talibanisation’.

Although the whole country is affected in varying degrees by the phenomenon, the problem has assumed ominous proportions in the North Western part of Pakistan — namely NWFP, FATA, and the Pakhtoon Balochistan. More recently, the Federal Capital has also fallen into the grip of clerical extremism.

One of the factors that led to Talibanisation in parts of Pakistan is the country’s foreign policy with regard to its immediate neighbor Afghanistan. It is now common knowledge how Pakistan supported the rise of Taliban in the late 1990s. Observers are of the view that the Taliban regime in Afghanistan serves as a model for all the contemporary extremist and Taliban groups in North Western Pakistan. However, it may also be noted that most Afghan Taliban leaders were educated in Pakistani religious seminaries. In fact, the term ‘Talib’ means student of a seminary.

One important aspect of religious extremism and Talibanisation in Pakistan is that most of these groups have a militant orientation and thrive on ‘violence’, so to say. These groups appear to have an outlandish political agenda that has growingly become a threat to the peace of the whole society. Therefore, it is most pertinent that one tries to explore the political philosophy of the extremists, especially the Talibans.

“We must study the emergence of Taliban in Afghanistan itself, because it is here that most of our local groups (of Taliban) have got their inspiration from,” opines Dr Sarfaraz Khan, former Professor School of Oriental and African Studies in London, currently teaching at Area Study Centre on Central Asia, China, Russia, Afghanistan at the University of Peshawar. He has also penned a book on the subject of the political thought in Islam, concentrating mainly on the Taliban phenomenon in the region.
In an exclusive interview with TNS, Dr Sarfaraz said: “We can always have a better idea about any religio-clerical movement in the Muslim history through the written material produced by the founder leadership of a movement. For instance, we can learn about Shia Islam in Iran through a rich collection of manuscripts that throw a detailed light on the policies followed. Likewise for Sunni Islam, in Egypt, we find thinkers who have compiled a coherent body of work. In Syria, we have people like Rasheed Rida who brought out some coherent thought regarding Salafia Islam. Even certain Wahabi sects in the Middle East have their political thought spelt out well. On the contrary, we find a lack of political thought in Afghanistan, especially in the context of Taliban, due basically to the absence of an academic tradition in the country’s schools and even religious madrasas.”

He went on to elaborate his point, “The Talibans are all rural based. They are not educated in either the so-called ‘worldly’ studies or religious disciplines, because none of them ever went to Deoband or any other historical house of knowledge. Besides, there are very few writings by Taliban leaders to come by. The only related literature that we find is through Rasmi Jareeda, famously known for its reproduction of the various farmaans (orders and edicts) of Amir ul Momineen Mullah Omar and the Ministry of Amr Bil Maroof Wa Nahi Anil Munkar (the promotion of virtue and the abolition of vice) and, at times, through the radio commentaries or speeches of the Taliban leaders. However, the available literature is not enough to know about political programme of Taliban.”

In this part of the world, writing as a category has not been recognized for centuries although the word used for Muslim school is Maktab which literally means the place where you write. But in Maktabs there has been no writing done at least after 12th century. These are, in the words of Dr Sarfaraz, ‘oral societies’ in that the method of teaching in their religious schools is mostly oral — individual to individual with no use of conventional teaching aids, such as the black boards, chalks, and markers.

“However, if we read the Rasmi Jareeda or listen to their official radio channel, ‘Da Shariat Ghag’ (Voice of Shariat), we find that they are preaching Shariah, or Islam for that matter, except that there is no coherent writing on Shariah.

“It appears that by talking about an ‘ideal Islam’, they mean to invoke the period that saw Prophet Muhammad (SAW) or the Caliphs. That, to my mind, is only a conjecture since you cannot recreate the past, and there is always a likelihood of people ending up with disagreements and differences of opinion.”

Talking about the genesis of ‘Talibanisation’, he said: “One way to judge the Taliban philosophy is from their actions. Here one finds that their greatest emphasis has been on certain punishments for certain acts that they call the Hudood laws. However, unlike in Pakistan, their laws were without codification or procedures.

“During their rule, the Taliban created the Ministry of Vice, which was based on a verse from the Holy Quran. One can simply say that there was no judicial process involved; they had certain Pashtoon tribal traditions amalgamated.

“In other words, the Taliban philosophy is representative of Muslim political thought except that it is heavily influenced by the tribal traditions — not only of the Pashtoons but also the Arabs. It is about the ‘imposition’ of tribal and rural values on the public at large.

“Of course, they are oblivious to the realities of the modern world and the challenges posed by the international relations,” he continued. “If we study the life and times of the Holy Prophet (PBUH), we find that he was very much aware of the diplomatic values and traditions of the time and used them effectively, too, such as with Najashi of Ethiopia. Which goes to show that the Taliban were not well-versed in the area that they claimed to be their ‘ideal’. They were too myopic, ignorant, and maybe, too adventurous.”

Dr Sarfaraz highlighted another important aspect of the Taliban regime, saying that all of their leaders “came from modest financial backgrounds. This is clearly in contravention of a tenet of classical Muslim political philosophy that the Amir should be from a well-off background, which definitely has a sound administrative rationale. Apart from the Islamic traditions, even the Pashtoon traditions were violated because in a Pakhtoon society, Mullah or cleric never had a central or leadership role rather the role has always been subservient and of little significance.

As far as the question whether Talibanisation is a dictatorship of clerics, Dr Sarfaraz said, “Yes, but it turned out to be the dictatorship of not all clerics but a specific brand of clerics.” He explained: “It is a typical Sunni brand which is more near to Wahabism, even not very strictly Wahabi-Deobandi brand. It is like something Deobandi, something Salafi, in between Wahabism plus tribal Pakhtoon traditions.

“The places facing Talibanisation include the entire Pashtoon areas. Of late, we have seen the country face a similar phenomenon, albeit at a small scale, right in the heart of Islamabad, in the shape of Lal Masjid-Jamia Hafsa.”

He also hinted at some ‘significant pockets’ of Taliban in Karachi.

“It is important to note that what these extremists do, ask for or write. Officially there is no single organ of Taliban, apart from Taliban of Waziristan. In Dir and Swat we have TNSM which predated Taliban.”

There are different groups of clerics having their respective central figure dictating the group and followers. They have been unable to evolve a unified set of objectives or a political philosophy, yes the strategy and tactics of harassing the population through violence is common, he said. “It is hard to know what kind of state(s) they want to create by implementing their respective Shariahs. For instance, jailed Mullah Sufi Muhammad then and now his son-in-law, Maulana Fazlullah, concentrated on Malakand, then Taliban of Waziristan and Bajaur wanted to have control in their respective tribal agencies. Then the Jamia Hafsa-Lal Masjid famed Aziz brothers have their eyes on Islamabad at least as the base of their Islamic State. In fact, the outlook of Waziristans’ Taliban has been so narrow and specific that they virtually turned Waziristan into a cleric state, which was referred to as Islamic State of Waziristan in the media,” he concluded.

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