This was sent to us by a regular reader and commenter on Take Back Pakistan. After listening to it, we felt it must be heard.

We will try to post a translated version of Hamid’s assessment tomorrow so that our non-Pakistanis can understand what he said.

The army is now called a state within a state, supporter of nuclear proliferation, permeated by fundamentalists and militants in its ranks and file and an institution that pursues big business rather than focus on its primary mission.

Despite suffering over 1,500 dead (the highest figure for any army) in this war, it is still accused of playing a double game. American organisations that once praised now call it ill-organised and badly trained to fight counter insurgency operations in FATA. The hardest criticism has come on the ISI. It is repeatedly accused of hobnobbing with militants and supporting Al Qaeda. This is the outfit busy in unravelling the plethora of intrigues played by diverse actors against the sovereignty of Pakistan operating with the tacit consent of US and Afghanistan.

Methodically, a new theme is being developed. Pakistan’s obsession with India and Kashmir does not allow it to focus unilaterally in FATA. The Taliban in this context are being described as a strategic asset of Pakistan army for its security objectives. The latest accusations to surface relate to the diversion of US funds for building up capabilities against India. No reference is being made to the fact that the mishandling of the situation in Afghanistan in fact adds to Pakistan’s security concerns.

The praetorian mindset within the Pakistan army has made matters worse for the country. The last two military coups of Pakistan got legitimised due to US geo-strategic interests in the regions. 9/11 was an opportunity for an otherwise besieged General Musharraf to get the Americans off his back and use them as erstwhile allies. The short-sightedness of his policy meant that the Pakistani military has been drawn into a most hostile environment – such as in FATA and Swat – where states and a maze of non-state actors compete for influence. The surveillance, intervention and connections of competing actors in the region are so effective that it leaves the local troops with little operational initiative. Read more »